UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

EDIBLE ARRANGMENTS, LLC and
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INTERNATIONAL, LLC
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:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

v.
PROVIDE COMMERCE, INC.,
Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:14-CV-00250 (VLB)

July 29, 2016

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Dkt. #116]

I.

Introduction
The Plaintiffs, Edible Arrangements, LLC, and Edible Arrangements

International, LLC, (“EA”) bring this action against Defendant Provide Commerce,
Inc. (“Provide”), alleging trademark infringement in violation of 15 U.S.C. §
1114(1)(A) (Count I); false designation of origin or sponsorship and unfair
competition in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(A) (Count II); trademark dilution in
violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(C) (Count III); common law trademark infringement
(Count IV); unfair competition and deceptive trade practices in violation of the
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. 42–110b(a) et seq.
(“CUTPA”) (Count V); and violations of the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(D) (“ACPA”) (Count VI). Currently pending
before the Court is the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. For the
reasons that follow, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED
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IN PART with respect to EA’s ACPA (Count VI) claim AND DENIED IN PART with
respect to all other claims (Counts I – V).
II.

Factual Background
a. The Parties
Plaintiff EA is a leading seller in the United States and internationally in

artfully designed fresh fruits that are sculpted in the shapes of flowers and
arranged to resemble floral arrangements. EA also sells “gourmet, chocolate
Dipped Fruit™, fruit salads, and fruit-based beverages.” [Def.’s Mem. at 3].
Defendant Provide is a direct competitor of the Plaintiff which sells a
variety of gift products including flowers, chocolates, fresh fruit, gift baskets, and
personalized gifts under brands such as “ProFlowers,” ProPlants,”
“RedEnvelope,” “Personal Creations,” “Shari’s Berries,” and Cherry Moon
Farms.” [Dkt. 118, Def.’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement (“SOMF”) ¶ 1]. Particularly
relevant to this case is Provide’s brand Shari’s Berries, which offers a variety of
items through its online store at <www.berries.com>, including “hand-dipped
strawberries, cherries, and apples; hand-decorated cake pops; handmade
s’mores; and pretzels hand-dipped in caramel and coated with decadent
toppings.” [Id. ¶ 2].
Provide does not sell shaped fruit or fruit that is packaged to resemble
floral arrangements. [Dkt. 119, Ex. 2; Pl.’s R. 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 9]. Provide
does sell coated fruit products that compete directly with some of EA’s “Dipped
Fruit™” products. [Dkt. 136, Ex. N.]. EA argues that its coated fruit products are
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superior because EA uses real chocolate in its fruit coatings, while Provide uses
imitation chocolate. [Dkt. 136, Ex. O, Ex. P]. Nonetheless, neither party appears
to dispute that Provide and EA are direct competitors in the market for chocolate
and fruit-based gift packages. [Dkt. 119, Ex. 2; Pl.’s Mem. at 5].

b. EA’s Mark and Its Use
EA has advertised, marketed and sold its fresh fruit products (“the EA
Goods”) under the trademark “EDIBLE ARRANGEMENTS” (“the EA Mark”) since
1998. [Dkt. 136, Ex. A ¶2.]. EA has been granted “multiple U.S. registrations for
the EA Mark,” including at least two registrations on the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) principal register, since as early as 2005, at U.S.
Reg. Nos. 3844160 and 2934715. [Dkt. 136, Ex. B]. EA’s mark has also been in
continuous use for seventeen years. [Pl.’s R. 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 3]. EA admits
that there have been “numerous attempts” to plagiarize the mark, which have
resulted in “aggressive polic[ing]” by EA in the form of cease and desist letters
sent to more than a dozen companies using the mark and at least one lawsuit.
[Id. ¶¶ 12-13].

c. Keyword Advertising
“Keyword advertising” is a common method of advertising used by
companies to market their products through programs offered by Internet search
engines such as Google, Bing, and Yahoo. [Def.’s R. 56(a)(1) Statement (“SOMF”)
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¶ 16]. The premise behind keyword advertising is that companies wish to have
their advertisements appear when consumers use search engines to search for
particular terms. [Id. ¶ 17]. To ensure that their advertisements appear when
consumers search for particular terms, companies pay fees to the search engines
by “bidding” on those terms. [Id. ¶ 19]. Consumers searching via Google, Bing,
and Yahoo have no way of knowing which particular terms advertisers have bid
on; thus, keyword bidding is often referred to as “non-consumer-facing.” [Id. ¶
20].
An example offered by the defendant would be the following scenario:
when a consumer enters “Pizza Hut pizza” into a search engine, competitors
such as Papa John’s, Domino’s, and Little Caesars wish to have their
advertisements appear on the results page so that the consumers may have easy
access to their websites and purchase their pizza. Such companies would thus
need to bid on keyword terms such as “pizza,” “Pizza Hut,” “Domino’s,” “Papa
John’s,” and “Little Caesars.” Figure I, below, depicts this scenario.
Figure I.
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Provide notes that it bids on thousands of terms, including some terms
that describe its products, such as “fruit,” “dipped berries,” “edible fruit,”
“flowers for moms,” “Valentine’s birthday cake,” “fruit bouquets,” and “edible
arrangements.” [Id. ¶ 23]. Provide also bids on EA’s mark as a keyword, so that
consumers searching for “edible arrangements” would see an ad for a Provide
gift-seller. [Id. ¶ 22]. In addition, EA notes, that Provide bids on keywords related
to EA that clearly are not descriptive of any Provide product, including “edible
arrangements locations,” “edible arrangements coupons,” “edible arrangements
promotional code,” “edible arrangements bouquet,” “edible arrangements
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flowers,” “cheap edible arrangements,” “edible arrangement discount,” and
“incredible edible arrangements.” [See Dkt. 136, Ex. X, Ex. Y, Ex. Z].

d. Provide’s Consumer-Facing Advertisements
Because of Provide’s purchase of the EA Mark as a keyword, when a
consumer would search for “edible arrangements,” Provide’s ad would populate
in the search results as an “Ad related to edible arrangements” and that exact
text appears at the top of Provide’s advertisement. [Dkt. 119, Ex. 25]. Beneath
the text that reads “ad related to edible arrangements,” the consumer would then
see the text of Provide’s actual advertising slogan(s). Prior to 2010, Provide used
the phrase “edible arrangements” to describe its products in its advertising
slogans. Sometime after receiving a cease and desist letter from EA in February,
2010, Provide began using variations of the mark, including “Edible Fruit
Arrangements” (e.g., “Save More Than 50% On Edible Fruit Arrangements”).1
[SOMF ¶ 24]. These advertisements are the subject of the instant suit.
Provide highlighted the term “Edible Fruit Arrangements” in its
advertisements in that the text containing that phrase was larger, underlined and
in a different color than that the font used in the rest of the advertisement. See
Figure I, infra. Provide claims that it only used this phrase “in close proximity to
its own brands, such as ProFlowers or Shari’s Berries.” [Id. ¶ 27]. However, EA

1

Provide also used EDIBLE ARRANGEMENTS as a keyword for products
completely unrelated to fruit – namely the ProFlowers floral products – because
the keyword “results in sales.” [See Ex DD., Two Dep. Tr. at 217:1-18].
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has provided an example of at least one such advertisement in which “Provide’s
brand names – ProFlowers, Shari’s Berries and Cherry Moon Farms – did not
appear anywhere in the ad except for the [URL] website address.” [Dkt. 119, Ex.
5]. Moreover, the web address appears in smaller text beneath EA’s mark and
does not necessarily identify the seller as a particular brand. [Id.]. The Provide
advertisement that is cited by EA as an example appears below at Figure II.
Provide claims that it no longer uses the phrase “Edible Fruit Arrangements” in
its advertisements.
Figure II.

e. Provide’s “Competitor” Marketing Campaign and EA’s Evidence of
Confusion
EA argues that in internal records, Provide identified EA as one of its
biggest competitors and engaged in a marketing campaign described as the
“Edible Arrangements Campaign” that is also labeled “competitor” (hereinafter
“the Competitor Campaign”). [Dkt. 136, Ex. AA, Ex. BB, Ex. CC at PC2828
(referencing “Edible Arrangement keyword set”), Ex. T, Ex. U]. Provide’s
Manager of Search Engine Marketing, Charles Twu, acknowledged that the
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purpose of the EA Competitor Campaign was to generate revenue by driving
traffic to Provide’s competing websites. [Ex. DD, Twu Dep. Tr. 199:4-200:5].
Keyword bidding on variations of the term “edible arrangements” is one of
Provide's most successful tools for converting sales. [See Dkt. 136, Ex. BB, Ex.
FF at PC2767, Ex. GG at PC2305]. In one document reviewing Provide’s 2012
Mother’s Day promotions, “‘EDIBLE ARRANGEMENTS” is the top generator of
“impressions” for Shari’s Berries. [Dkt. 136, Ex. EE at PC_0002774]. An
“impression” occurs when an advertisement is displayed on a potential
consumer’s search results page. [See Ex. DD, Twu Dep. Tr. 43:16-18]. EA argues
that Provide’s “Competitor Campaign” has in turn generated numerous
“conversions” for Provide. [Dkt. 133, Pl.’s R. 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 20]. A
“conversion” occurs when a consumer clicks on an ad and places an order. [Id.].
EA sent a letter to Provide on February 9, 2010, objecting to Provide’s use
of the phrase “edible arrangements” in “advertising several competing goods
and services.” [SOMF ¶ 29]. On March 25, 2010, Provide tacitly admitted that it
used the phrase in its response, explaining the steps it had taken to ensure that
the exact phrase “edible arrangements” would no longer appear in the text of its
advertisements displayed through the Google AdWords program. [Id. ¶ 35].
Four, years later, on February 6, 2014, EA sent another letter to Provide, again
objecting to Provide’s: (i) purchase of the phrase “edible arrangements” as a
non-consumer-facing keyword through the Google AdWords and Bing Ads
programs; and (ii) use of the phrase “edible fruit arrangements” in the text of its
advertisements displayed through the Google AdWords and Bing Ads programs.
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[Id. ¶ 39]. Two weeks after EA’s second letter, EA filed the instant action against
Provide.
During discovery, EA produced call log records of seven telephone calls
from consumers to its customer service department inquiring about the status of
orders which were not placed with EA. EA representatives suspected (but were
unable to confirm in every case) the consumers were instead attempting to place
or may have actually placed an order with companies affiliated with Provide.
[SOMF ¶¶ 73-74]. The records of these seven calls do not reflect whether the
orders in question originated with the consumer clicking on one of Provide’s
keyword advertisements. [Id. ¶ 74].

f. Provide’s Alleged Cybersquatting
In early 2014 EA became aware of several “typosquatting” domains – web
addresses similar to EA’s web address and mark but using deliberate
misspellings – including edibelarrangements.com, ediblearangements.com, and
ediblearragements.com (hereinafter the “Typosquatting Domains”). [See Dkt. No.
32 at ¶24]. It is undisputed that the registrants of the Typosquatting Domains are
foreign domain privacy services, including a Panamanian entity known as
Fundacion Private Whois (“Fundacion”) and an Australian entity known as
“Whois Privacy Services Pty Ltd.” (“Whois Privacy”).2 [See Dkt. No. 53-3; 53-4;

2

The parties dispute whether EA is able to subpoena the entities in the United
States or file a Uniform Domain Name Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) action in order
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53-5]. It is also undisputed that Provide did not register the domain names.
[SOMF ¶ 46].
EA asserts, however, that agents of Provide control the domain names.
Specifically, EA contends that Provide hired two digital marketing companies in
late 2013 to increase its web traffic – adMarketplace, Inc. and 7Search, Inc. [See
Dkt. 136, Ex. KK, (adMarketplace contract); Ex. LL, pp. 21-28 (invoices)]. The two
companies placed advertisements on the Typosquatting Domains and redirected
traffic landing at the domains to Provide’s own websites. During discovery, EA
obtained records showing that the Typosquatting Domains redirected to
berries.com over 1700 times and that the redirections appeared to occur through
adMarketplace and 7search. [See Dkt. 136, Ex. II; Ex. EE]. Provide admits that it
“suspects” the two companies “may have been involved in the redirection of the
domain names.” [SOMF ¶ 56]. Provide sent letters to both companies instructing
them to discontinue the redirection of traffic to Provide’s websites. [Id. ¶ 57]. EA
claims that the redirection of traffic from the Typosquatting Domains ceased
immediately thereafter.

III.

Legal Standard
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

to reveal the true registrant. EA argues that neither measure would be effective.
[Pl.’s Mem. at 11, n. 13].
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as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of
proving that no factual issues exist. Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98,
106 (2d Cir. 2010). “In determining whether that burden has been met, the court is
required to resolve all ambiguities and credit all factual inferences that could be
drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Id.
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). “If there is any evidence in the
record that could reasonably support a jury's verdict for the nonmoving party,
summary judgment must be denied.” Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Hapag Lloyd
Container Linie, GmbH, 446 F.3d 313, 315–16 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
“A party opposing summary judgment cannot defeat the motion by relying
on the allegations in his pleading, or on conclusory statements, or on mere
assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible. At the summary
judgment stage of the proceeding, Plaintiffs are required to present admissible
evidence in support of their allegations; allegations alone, without evidence to
back them up, are not sufficient.” Welch–Rubin v. Sandals Corp., No.3:03cv481,
2004 WL 2472280, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 20, 2004) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted); Martinez v. State of Connecticut, No. 3:09cv1341 (VLB), 2011
WL 4396704 at *6 (D. Conn. Sept. 21, 2011). Where there is no evidence upon
which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it
and upon whom the onus of proof is imposed, such as where the evidence
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offered consists of conclusory assertions without further support in the record,
summary judgment may lie. Fincher v. Depository Trust and Clearance Co., 604
F.3d 712 (2d Cir. 2010).

IV.

Discussion
a. EA’s Claim for Trademark Infringement
To succeed on its trademark infringement claim, EA must prove that:

(i) “its mark is entitled to protection,” and (ii) “even more important, that the
defendant's use of its own mark will likely cause confusion with the plaintiff's
mark.” Gruner + Jahr USA Pub. v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1074 (2d Cir.
1993). This same test also applies to EA’s claims for: (i) federal trademark
infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (ii) federal false designation of origin and
unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (iii) common law trademark
infringement; and (iv) state unfair competition and deceptive trade practices
under Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-110b(a). See Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141,
146 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying the two-prong test to claims under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114,
1125(a)); Verilux, Inc. v. Hahn, No. 05-Civ-254, 2007 WL 2318819, at *10 (D. Conn.
Aug. 10, 2007) (test for common law trademark infringement and unfair
competition under Connecticut law is identical to that under the Lanham Act).
Provide does not dispute that EA’s trademark is valid and protectable;
rather, the parties have presented three issues for resolution. Those issues are (i)
whether Provide’s use of “EDIBLE FRUIT ARRANGEMENTS” in consumer-facing
ads creates a likelihood of confusion, (b) whether EA can assert a trademark
12

infringement claim based solely on Provide’s purchase of the EA Mark as a non
consumer-facing keyword and whether such purchases create a likelihood of
confusion, and (c) whether Provide’s advertisements constitute fair use of the
mark. [See Def.’s Mem. at 15-16]. The Court considers each issue in turn.

i. Whether Provide’s Use of “EDIBLE FRUIT ARRANGMENTS” is
Likely to Cause Confusion
“[T]he crucial issue in an action for trademark infringement or unfair
competition is whether there is any likelihood that an appreciable number of
ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused,
as to the source of the goods in question.” Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R. G. Barry
Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978). Federal courts determine whether a mark is
likely to cause confusion based on an assessment of the Polaroid factors. These
factors include: (i) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (ii) the degree of similarity
between the competing marks; (iii) the proximity of the products, and the
likelihood that the prior owner will “bridge the gap”; (iv) actual confusion; (v) the
defendant’s good faith; (vi) the quality of the defendant’s products; and (vii) the
sophistication of the consumers. The Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hosp. Corp., 89
F.3d 955, 960 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d
492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)).
Summary judgment of non-infringement in a trademark case is proper
when the balance of factors weighs in the defendant’s favor such that no
reasonable jury could find a likelihood of confusion; however, a court need not
find that all factors weigh in the defendant’s favor. See, e.g., Streetwise Maps,
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Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 21 159 F.3d 739, 746 (2d Cir. 1998) (balance of factors
weighed in the defendant’s favor even though the mark was entitled to some
protection and the parties’ products were in direct competition).

1. The Strength of EA’s Mark
The strength of a mark refers to “its tendency to identify the goods [or
services] sold under the mark as emanating from a particular, although possibly
anonymous, source.” The Sports Authority, 89 F.3d at 961 (quoting McGregor–
Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir.1979)). There are two
components of a marks’ strength: its inherent distinctiveness and the
distinctiveness it has acquired in the marketplace.” Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s
Rest., 360 F.3d 125, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
An incontestable, registered trademark enjoys a presumption of inherent
distinctiveness. Savin Corp. v. Savin Grp., 391 F.3d 439, 457 (2d Cir. 2004). The
parties dispute the extent to which EA has been able to register the marks.
Provide notes that “when EA first applied to federally register “edible
arrangements” as a trademark in 1999, the USPTO refused registration on the
basis of descriptiveness” which led EA to amend its application to seek registry
on the secondary supplemental federal trademark register “thereby conceding
that the phrase ‘edible arrangements’ is descriptive.” [SOMF ¶ 8; Dkt 119-4, Ex.
B]. EA, however, has submitted at least one registration of the phrase “edible
arrangements” which has been accepted on the principal register, has been in
continuous use with no adverse decisions against the mark for more than five
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years and which bears no disclaimer. [See Dkt. 134, Ex. C (U.S. Reg. No.
2934715)]. That registration is therefore incontestable. See 15 U.S.C. §1065.
The strength of an incontestable registered trademark may be overcome by
the use of a descriptive or weak portion of the mark, or generic and descriptive
words taken from a stylized logo. See W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. The Gillette
Co., 984 F.2d 567 (2d Cir.1993) (incontestable registered trademark for
“Sportstick” lip balm not infringed by Gillette's “Sport Stick” deodorant); Gruner
+ Jahr USA Pub., a Div. of Gruner + Jahr Printing & Pub. Co. v. Meredith Corp.,
991 F.2d 1072, 1077-78 (2d Cir. 1993) (where stylized logo of the word “parents”
for a magazine title was an incontestable mark, use of the word “parents”
divorced from that logo was “clearly weak”). Provide, which bears the burden of
proof in moving for summary judgment, has not argued or offered evidence that
EA’s incontestable registration concerns only a stylized logo from which Provide
has taken descriptive words and has therefore failed to rebut the presumption in
favor of inherent distinctiveness.3
Moreover, the Court finds that EA’s mark has acquired secondary meaning
or distinctiveness in the marketplace. In evaluating whether a mark has obtained
secondary meaning, courts look to a number of factors, including: “(1)
advertising expenditures, (2) consumer confusion studies, (3) unsolicited media
coverage of the product, (4) sales success, (5) attempts to plagiarize the mark,

3

Indeed, Provide’s reply memorandum did not contest EA’s assertion that it
possesses an incontestable registration and ignores the issue altogether.
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and (6) length and exclusivity of the mark’s use.” Connecticut Cmty. Bank v. The
Bank of Greenwich, 578 F. Supp. 2d 405, 413 (D. Conn. 2008).
EA has submitted evidence that the mark has been in continuous use for
seventeen years and that EA has spent “over $160 million in advertising since
2008.” [Dkt. 134, Ex. C. (Dipippa Decl.)]. EA has garnered unsolicited media
attention by, for example, “repeatedly being named a Top Franchise by
Entrepreneur Magazine . . . [and] being named E! News’ gift of choice for Golden
Globe nominees.” [Dkt. 134, Ex.’s D-L]. EA has earned billions of dollars in
revenues since 2001. [Dkt 134, Ex. C]. EA has not submitted any consumer
confusion studies, but it does cite a survey conducted by Provide which found
that EA had 77% brand awareness among consumers nationally. [Dkt. 134, Ex. M.
at PC 000967]. Provide has pointed to numerous attempts to plagiarize the mark
by other parties, prompting EA to send “dozens” of cease and desist letters to a
range of both large and small businesses. [SOMF ¶ 12]. Provide has offered no
further evidence suggesting non-distinctiveness in the marketplace. On these
facts, a reasonable jury could conclude that EA’s mark has acquired secondary
distinctiveness in the marketplace.
A reasonable jury could certainly conclude that the strength of EA’s mark
weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion because the mark has both
inherent distinctiveness by virtue of its incontestable registration, as well as
secondary distinctiveness in the marketplace.
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2. The degree of similarity between the competing marks
In assessing the similarity of the marks at issue, courts look to two key
questions: (1) whether the similarity between the two marks is likely to cause
confusion and (2) what effect the similarity has upon prospective purchasers.
The Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 962.
Provide notes that “each trademark must be compared in its entirety;
juxtaposing fragments of each mark does not demonstrate whether the marks as
a whole are confusingly similar.” [Def.’s Mem. At 24, citing Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming summary
judgment finding that “Donkey Kong” does not create a likelihood of confusion
with “King Kong”)]. Provide argues that its use of the phrase “edible fruit
arrangements” is distinguishable from EA’s mark “because it was not used in a
trademark sense, and because it contains the additional term “fruit,” which EA’s
mark does not contain.” [Def.’s Mem. At 24].
With regard to the addition of the word “fruit” to the mark, EA argues,
persuasively, that “a subsequent user may not avoid likely confusion about the
origin or the product by appropriating another's entire mark and adding
descriptive or non-descriptive matter to it.” [Pl.’s Mem. At 19, citing Fisons
Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Industries, Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 477 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation
omitted)]. To state the obvious, fruit offered for sale is supposed to be edible.
The word “edible” is a superfluous modifier of the word “fruit” in an
advertisement for a fresh fruit product offered for sale by a company named
“Sheri’s Berries.” A typical consumer would likely realize that “Sheri’s Berries”
17

was offering for sale fruit which was edible, as opposed to inedible, plastic or
imitation fruit decorations. A reasonable jury could find that the addition of the
word fruit does not serve a clear “differentiating role.” Morningside Group, 182
F.3d at 141 (addition of the words “capital” and the substitution of “LLC” for
“limited” did little to differentiate “The Morningside Group Limited” from
“Morningside Capital Group, L.L.C.”); see also, Connecticut Community Bank,
578 F. Supp. 2d at 418 (addition of the word “Trust” did little to differentiate
“Greenwich Bank & Trust” from “The Bank of Greenwich”).
Provide also argues that the marks can be differentiated because it used
the phrase “edible fruit arrangements” in conjunction with reference to its
“house” brands (e.g., ‘Shari’s Berries’). Those terms, however, were not always
used in conjunction with one another. In at least one of the advertisements
provided to the Court by EA, Provide’s “house brand” only appears in the web
address of a link contained in the advertisement. Further, it appeared beneath
the much larger and more readable text advertising, with each word capitalized,
“Edible Fruit Arrangements.” See Figure II above. The "house brand" is not
prominently displayed and when it is displayed it is virtually obscured by the far
more prominent term “Edible Fruit Arrangements.”
A reasonable trier of fact could therefore find that Provide has not
distinguished its use of the mark with its own branding. The operative and
identifying words of both marks are the words “edible” and “arrangements” and
as such the marks are highly similar. This factor weighs heavily in favor of EA.
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3. Similarity of Competing Products
The third Polaroid factor focuses on whether the two products compete
with each other. “To the extent goods (or trade names) serve the same purpose,
fall within the same general class, or are used together, the use of similar
designations is more likely to cause confusion.” Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 458.
Provide does not dispute that its fruit products are similar to EA’s fruit products.
However, Provide argues, without citation to authority, that this factor “should
not weigh heavily in the analysis because the products that are similar are exactly
the products that are described both by EA’s mark and by the descriptive phrase
used by Provide.” [Def.’s Mem. At 32]. On the contrary, the fact that Provide is a
direct competitor selling goods within the same general class (even the same
specific category of gift) and serving the same purpose weighs heavily in favor of
finding that Provide’s use of EA’s mark is likely to cause confusion. See
Connecticut Community Bank, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 418 (noting that ‘Greenwich
Bank & Trust’ and ‘The Bank of Greenwich’ “provide virtually identical banking
services . . . to an identical consumer base . . . [t]his factor weighs heavily in
[Plaintiff’s] favor.”).

4. Actual Confusion
Evidence that confusion has actually occurred is “convincing evidence that
confusion is likely to occur.” Morningside Group, 182 F.3d at 141. Provide
argues that EA has not “offered any survey evidence showing a likelihood of
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confusion.” [Def.’s Mem. at 26]. However, “although the absence of surveys is
evidence that actual confusion cannot be shown,” a reasonable trier of fact “may
still conclude that actual confusion exists in the absence of such evidence, so
long as there is other evidence of actual confusion.” The Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at
964 (internal citations omitted).
EA notes that it has identified seven instances where consumers
“contacted EA’s customer call center with inquiries and/or complaints about
purchases made from Provide under the mistaken impression that the companies
were either the same or affiliated.” [SOMF ¶¶ 73-74]. Provide argues that these
incidents do not evidence actual confusion because, EA did not identify whether
the orders about which the calls were made originated with the consumers
clicking on one of Provide’s keyword advertisements and that the consumers
actually made the purchases from a Provide company believing that they were
purchasing the products through EA. [Id.].
However, “evidence of actual confusion need not be limited to evidence of
mistaken completed transactions” and the inquiry “need not be confined to
evidence that [the Defendant] was able to ‘pass off’ its services as those of
[Plaintiff].” Morningside Group, 182 F.3d at 141. Rather, evidence of actual
confusion “regarding affiliation or sponsorship is also entirely relevant to the
ultimate likelihood-of-confusion inquiry.” Id.; see also The Sports Auth., 89 F.3d
at 964 (Plaintiff’s evidence of “misdirected phone calls” and evidence that
customers believed there was “a connection between the restaurants and the
stores” was sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact). Provide also argues that
20

“such a small number of anecdotes is insufficient evidence of actual confusion
when weighed against EA’s substantial market success.” [Def.’s Mem. at 27,
citing Alzheimer's Found. of Am., Inc. v. Alzheimer's Disease & Related Disorders
Ass'n, Inc., No. 10 CIV. 3314 RWS, 2015 WL 4033019, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2015)
(“[A] small handful of anecdotes. . . is insufficient to establish the presence of
actual confusion, particularly when weighed against the nearly $100 million in
successful donations that [Plaintiff] receives annually.”)].
The Court agrees that the seven incidents of misdirected consumer calls
and inquiries seem de minimis in comparison with the volume of business
transacted by both EA and Provide. The jury may appropriately consider the
number of instances of confusion identified by EA in determining the weight of
EA’s evidence as to actual confusion. At this stage, EA’s evidence is sufficient to
create a material issue of fact as to the extent of actual confusion as to the
origination and sponsorship of Provide's products caused by Provide’s use of the
mark. The Court does not consider this factor to weigh appreciably in favor of
EA.

5. ‘Bridging the Gap’
As the two parties operate in the same market and directly compete, there
is no gap to bridge, and therefore this factor weighs firmly in favor of EA. See
Connecticut Community Bank, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 418 (“[T]he two banks are
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already in direct competition . . . there is no gap to bridge, and this factor weighs
in favor of [plaintiff].”).

6. The Defendant’s Lack of Good Faith
In assessing good faith, courts look to “whether the defendant adopted its
mark with the intention of capitalizing on plaintiff's reputation and goodwill and
any confusion between his and the senior user's product.” The Sports Auth., 89
F.3d at 964 (citations omitted).
Several facts lead the Court to conclude that a reasonable juror could find
that Provide has acted in bad faith in the instant case. First, as discussed above,
the word “edible” is an unnecessary descriptor of the word “fruit” and the word
“arrangements” is hardly the most precise descriptor of boxes in which Provide
has “deliberately placed” chocolate-dipped strawberries. To once more state the
obvious, every marketed product is arranged to look appealing or to avoid
damage in transit or both. A consumer would not expect a box of hand-dipped
strawberries in which the strawberries were haphazardly dumped into a box and
partially melted into a mess of coated fruit. Such pragmatic ‘arrangements’ are
not descriptive of the product but merely standard packaging. From these two
facts alone a reasonable jury could infer intent to exploit the goodwill created by
EA’s existing mark. Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 689 F.2d
1127, 1134 (2d Cir. 1982) (evidence of bad faith in deliberate use of wording
similar to a protected mark where the chosen wording does not appropriately
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describe the product at issue). Second, EA’s evidence that Provide may have
hired third party web advertisers to generate web traffic from “typosquatting”
domains based on the EA mark to Provide’s own websites may provide a
reasonable trier of fact with further indicia of bad faith on the part of Provide.
Third, a reasonable juror can infer that the keyword bidding, typosquatting
redirection of traffic, and advertisements based on the EA mark may have all
been components of a deliberate marketing campaign on Provide’s part to
generate “impressions” and “conversions” from consumers searching for EA
products based on the EA mark. This factor weighs in favor of EA.

7. Product Quality
Provide argues that the products offered for sale by the two parties are of
similar quality. EA argues that its products are of higher quality because, with
respect the parties’ “dipped” or fruit products, Provide sells fruit dipped in
“imitation chocolate,” while EA uses “real chocolate.” [Pl.’s Mem. at 32]. This
difference in quality, if true, raises sufficient evidence to at least create a material
issue of fact as to differences in product quality. However, this factor does not
weigh appreciably in EA's favor.

8. Consumer Sophistication
The seventh Polaroid factor requires a court to analyze the sophistication
of the consumers purchasing the competing products. Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495
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(2d Cir. 1961). Highly sophisticated consumers are less likely to be confused.
Plus Prods. v. Plus Disc. Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1007 (2d Cir. 1983).
Provide argues, without citation to facts in the record, that “both EA’s and
Provide’s consumers are individuals seeking to purchase high-quality gifts for
special occasions.” [Def.’s Mem. at 31]. Provide also argues that there is “no
evidence in the record to suggest that the parties’ consumers are not sufficiently
sophisticated.” [Id.]
EA has pointed to evidence that “the parties’ respective coated fruit goods
are food items that generally are sold for between $20 and $40.” [Pl.’s Mem. at
24; Dkt. 119, Ex. 2]. Where the products at issue are “relatively inexpensive
items,” a trier of fact “may be justified in concluding that the parties' customers
are not likely to be sophisticated purchasers as to the goods in question.” The
Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 965; Lever Bros. Co. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 693 F.2d 251,
259 (2d Cir.1982).
A reasonable juror could conclude that a buyer of an “arranged” fruit gift
package is no more sophisticated than a buyer of flowers, greeting cards or
chocolates. See, e.g., Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 219
(2d Cir. 2003) (New York consumers of specialty pastas deemed unsophisticated
because the pastas were inexpensive and sold in grocery stores, despite
arguments that New Yorkers were “savvy and knowledgeable about restaurants
and food.”). While Second Circuit case law has associated the purchase of lowcost goods in a supermarket environment with low customer sophistication,
"price alone is not determinative of the care a consumer will take in making
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purchases, and our touchstone remains the general impression that is left with
the ordinary consumer.” The Sports Auth., supra at 965.
Edible Arrangements and Provide's products are not expensive luxury
products, but they are also not every day consumables one purchases in a
supermarket. They are moderately priced gift items which would be purchased
with some, but not a great deal of scrutiny. The marketplace in which the
products are sold also weighs against sophistication. Internet purchasing is both
fast-paced and rapidly evolving. Increasingly, purchases are often made
impulsively on small screen cellular telephones or even using cell phone
applications. Given the relatively low price of the items and the evolving online
marketplace, the court finds that this factor weighs in favor of EA.

9. Overall Assessment
The Court has found that five of the seven Polaroid factors weigh in favor
of EA and that EA has at least raised a material issue of fact as to the remaining
two. In particular, the strength of EA’s mark, the similarity of the competing
marks, the similarity of the competing products and the defendant’s bad faith
each strongly suggest a likelihood of confusion from Provide’s use of its mark.
Provide’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to EA’s trademark infringement
claims (Counts I, II, IV and V) is therefore DENIED.

ii. Keyword Purchases Under the Lanham Act
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Provide next argues that its bidding on the phrase “edible arrangments” as
a “non-consumer-facing keyword” for its search engine advertisements does not
create a likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act. The Second Circuit has
held that keyword bidding may constitute a “use in commerce” which would be
“subject to the same analysis under Lanham Act as any other allegation of
infringement.” Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127 (2nd Cir. 2009).
Provide nonetheless argues that “no one court in the entire country has ever held
a defendant liable for trademark infringement by finding a likelihood of confusion
based solely on the defendant’s keyword bidding.” [Def.’s Mem. at 31]. Provide’s
argument, however, misses the point – the conduct at issue is not a defendant’s
keyword bidding, considered in a vacuum, but rather the effect of the keyword
bidding in conjunction with the defendant’s advertisement.
In Rescuecom, the Second Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of a
complaint against Google’s sale of a plaintiff’s mark in its AdWords program. 562
F.3d at 130. The court held that the sale of the mark as a keyword could
constitute a “use in commerce” under the Lanham Act and also could create a
likelihood of confusion if searchers were “misleadingly directed to the ads and
websites of its competitors in a manner which leads them to believe mistakenly
that these ads or websites are sponsored by, or affiliated with the plaintiff.” Id.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he potential infringement in this
context arises from the risk that while using [Plaintiff’s] mark to search for
information about [Plaintiff’s] product, a consumer might be confused by a
results page that shows a competitor's advertisement on the same screen, when
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that advertisement does not clearly identify the source or its product. Network
Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1149 (9th Cir.
2011). Thus, the crux of the issue is whether a defendant’s keyword purchases,
combined with the look and placement of that defendant’s advertisement, create
a search results page which misleads, confuses or misdirects a consumer
searching for a trademarked brand to the website of a competitor in a manner in
which the source of the products offered for sale by the competitor is unclear.4
The Second Circuit, however, has not adopted an explicit test for
determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists from a defendant’s purchase
of a trademark as a keyword term. Both parties urge application of the Polaroid
factors and note that at least two courts in this circuit have examined instances in
which a competitor uses a trademark to purchase keywords by looking to the
same seven Polaroid factors. See Alzheimer's Foundation, 2015 WL 4033019 at
*8; CJ Products LLC v. Snuggly Plushez LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 127, 158 (E.D.N.Y.
2011). Several of the Polaroid factors, however, are not particularly helpful in this
context, and the court in the Alzheimer’s case primarily considered the actual
confusion factor. With regard to actual confusion, the Alzheimer’s court looked

4

In Rescuecom, the Second Circuit found that the plaintiff had a plausible claim under the
Lanham Act against the search provider (as opposed to the advertiser) in part because the
plaintiff alleged that “the advertiser's link appears in a horizontal band at the top of the list of
search results in a manner which makes it appear to be the most relevant search result and
not an advertisement.” 562 F.3d at 130‐131. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged that Google
failed to “adequately identify the sponsored link as an advertisement, rather than a relevant
search result.” Id. Thus a likelihood of confusion may have been created because a consumer
searching for results by using the plaintiff’s mark would have been misled into believing that
the defendant’s website was “most relevant” to the plaintiff’s mark and therefore that the
defendant’s website was affiliated with the plaintiff. Id.
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to the doctrine of “initial interest confusion,” in which “a likelihood of confusion
can arise when ‘a consumer who searches for the plaintiff's website with the aid
of a search engine is directed instead to the defendant's site because of a
similarity in the parties' website address.” 2015 WL 4033019, at *7 (quoting CJ
Products, 809 F.Supp.2d at 160). The Alzheimer’s court also considered the
similarity of the marks factor by looking to the similarity of the URLs and the text
in the links of the two competitors on the search results page. Id., see also CJ
Products, 809 F.Supp.2d at 160 (examining the similarity of the marks in the
AdWords context and considering “the degree of similarity between [p]laintiff[s]’
service mark and the . . . advertisements appearing on the search-results page”).
However, the Alzheimer’s court also noted that “[c]ompanies can and do
regularly purchase other companies’ marks as search keywords and use those
companies’ trademarks in the text of their search advertising in order to draw a
contrast with the searched-for product and offer their own as an alternative.”
2015 WL 4033019, at *6. As an example, the Alzheimers court noted that “a
Yahoo! search for the term “Honda Civic” brings up ads linking to websites from
Hyundai, Volkswagen, and Toyota, comparing the Civic to their cars and
suggesting that the consumer purchase an Elantra, Jetta, or Corolla instead.” Id.
The court held that those ads did not implicate the Lanham Act “because they
draw a clear distinction between the products and do not imply the trademark
holder's sponsorship or approval.” Id.
Thus, prior courts have been primarily concerned with keyword bidding in
conjunction with advertising that creates a search results page that is misleading
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to the consumer. In considering the question of whether such conduct violates
the Lanham Act, several Polaroid factors can be helpful when viewed from the
perspective of a user of the internet search engine at issue (the “user”), in
particular: (i) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark as a unique search term related
to a distinct line of products, and (ii) the similarity of the marks and whether the
defendant’s mark draws a clear distinction as a competing brand. One additional
factor described by the Ninth Circuit in Network Automation can also be helpful:
(iii) what the consumer saw on the screen and reasonably believed, given the
context. 638 F.3d at 1150.
With regard to the strength of the mark, the court considers whether a user
entering EA’s mark as a search term “is more likely to be looking for a particular
product” rather than a category of products, and therefore “could be more
susceptible to confusion when sponsored links appear that advertise a similar
product from a different source.” Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1149. The
Court earlier found that there was evidence that EA’s mark had acquired
secondary distinctiveness in the marketplace. Similarly, the Court here finds that
a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that a consumer searching for “edible
arrangements” is looking for a distinct product line of aesthetically shaped fruit
and not merely for any and all gifts containing boxes of edible fruits and berries.
And with regard to the similarity of the marks, the Court finds that the Provide
advertisements it has examined make a very poor effort to differentiate either a
competing product or seller.
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The Ninth Circuit also looked to “what the consumer saw on the screen and
reasonably believed, given the context.” Id. at 1150, quoting Hearts on Fire Co. v.
Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F.Supp.2d 274, 289 (D. Mass. 2009). As to this factor, one
district court in the District of Massachusetts considered possible “downstream”
confusion, and whether the user would be unknowingly misdirected to the
website of a competitor. See Hearts on Fire Co., 603 F.Supp.2d at 289 (noting the
importance of whether “the consumer clicked on the sponsored link thinking that
he would find products” affiliated with the mark, but upon landing at the
competitor’s website “nothing there would immediately alert him to his mistake”).
Here, Provide’s choice not to identify Pro Flowers or Sherri’s Berries as the
advertiser in the text of the advertisement or the link, and only in the small print
of the URL, contributes to a misleading environment for the consumer. In
particular, a user searching for EA’s products might not even know that they had
clicked on a link for a competitor’s product until they actually landed on the
webpage of one of Provide’s sellers, or even after that point
A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Provide’s purchase of “edible
arrangements” as a non-consumer facing keyword could result in a likelihood of
confusion by directing consumers to a search results page in which it advertised
“edible fruit arrangements” in an text advertisement in which the seller is only
identified in the small print of the URL. See Figure II. A jury could find that the
purpose and effect of Provide’s keyword bidding – in conjunction with its use of
EA’s mark in its advertisement on the search results page – was to mislead
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consumers as to sponsorship or affiliation with EA and to misdirect the web
traffic of users searching for EA’s mark.

iii. Provide’s Defense of Fair Use
A company’s use of such descriptive words and phrases to describe that
company’s products may constitute “descriptive fair use” and be permissible
even where a plaintiff owns a federal registration for a trademark that is similar to
the phrase that the defendant uses to describe its goods. 15 U.S.C.A. §
1115(b)(4). Courts use a three-part test to determine whether use of a mark is a
descriptive fair use, namely, if the use was made: (1) other than as a mark, (2) in a
descriptive sense, and (3) in good faith. Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F. 3d 295,
308 (2nd Cir. 2013). Provide argues that it did not use the phrase “edible fruit
arrangements” as a trademark, and EA did not contest this.5 Rather, the parties
dispute whether Provide’s use of the phrase was descriptive and in good faith.
Provide argues that its use of “edible fruit arrangements” was descriptive
because the phrase describes the composition of several of its products, which
“are fruit products (“fruit”)” that “are organized in a certain manner (“arranged”)”
and are “intended for consumption (“edible”).” [Def.’s Mem. at 18]. Provide has

5

“A trademark use occurs when a mark indicates the source or origin of
consumer products.” Dessert Beauty, Inc. v. Fox, 568 F. Supp. 2d 416, 424
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) aff'd, 329 F. App’x 333 (2d Cir. 2009). The Second Circuit has
equated “use as a mark with the use of a term as a symbol to attract public
attention.” JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, 568 F.3d 390, 400 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal
quotations omitted).
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not identified which of its products, specifically, qualify in its view as edible
arrangements of fruit. EA argues that Provide does not sell “arrangements” at all
and submitted as an exhibit in opposition to Provide’s Motion for Summary
Judgment a photograph of one of Provide’s fruit products in which chocolatedipped berries were, in Provide’s own words, “organized so that the berries are
evenly spaced and angled toward a particular corner of the box.” [Def.’s Rep.
Mem. at 3; Dkt. 136, Ex. TT]. Provide describes this as an “arrangement.” [Id.].
Miriam Webster defines an “arrangement” as “the way that things or
people are organized for a particular purpose or activity.”6 The dictionary
definition of the word does not include any component requiring artistic
placement or organization. Thus, Provide is correct that for its products to
constitute an “arrangement,” the definition of the word requires only a purposeful
or intentional presentation, which would seemingly include a box of strawberries
that are evenly spaced and facing the same direction.
A consumer and a reasonable juror, however, may understand the word
“arrangement” to connote both purposefulness as well as something more, such
as a collection of items that is organized in an artistic or creative manner –
presented so as to enhance aesthetic value through color, shape or format.
Thus, Provide’s use of the word “arrangement” may be literally accurate but
descriptively misleading. Similarly, while the word “edible” is an accurate
description of the fruit Provide sells, a reasonable juror may find that the word is,

6

http://www.merriam‐webster.com/dictionary/arrangement
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as the Court discussed above, largely redundant of the word “fruit,” given that
few consumers are likely searching for “inedible fruit.” See EMI Catalogue P'ship
v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 65 (2d Cir. 2000)
(material issue of fact as to descriptive use where the alliterative phrase “Swing
Swing Swing” was unnecessary to describe the actions of three actors hitting
golf shots when the single word “swing” would have sufficed). The defense of
fair use is designed to protect “the public's right to use descriptive words or
images in good faith in their ordinary descriptive sense.” Car-Freshner Corp. v.
S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995). EA has raised a material
issue of fact as to whether Provide’s use of the phrase “edible fruit
arrangements” relies upon the ordinary meanings of those words to describe a
product containing a box of “deliberately placed” strawberries.
But even if Provide’s use of the phrase was appropriately descriptive, a
reasonable juror could find that Provide chose to use the words “edible” and
“arrangements” in bad faith in order to maximize consumer confusion and
generate sales from misdirected web traffic, when other terms not involving EA’s
mark could have better described Provide’s products (such as, e.g., “chocolatedipped berries” instead of “edible fruit” and “gift boxes” instead of
“arrangements”). In addition, for the reasons discussed above in examining the
Polaroid factors, a reasonable juror could certainly find that in the instant case
Provide deliberately chose the phrase “edible fruit arrangements” as part of a
marketing campaign designed to capitalize on the popularity of EA's products by
misdirecting consumer traffic to Provide’s websites through the use of EA’s mark
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in advertising, keyword bidding and typosquatting. EA has therefore raised a
material issue of fact as to whether Provide’s use of the phrase “edible fruit
arrangements” was truly descriptive and in good faith.

b. EA’s Claim for Trademark Dilution
The Trademark Dilution Revision Act (“TDRA”) “allows the owner of a
‘famous mark’ to enjoin a person from using ‘a mark or trade name in commerce
that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous
mark.’” Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc ., 600 F.3d 93, 110–11 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)). Dilution is defined as “the lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125. To
plead dilution under the TDRA, a trademark owner must allege four elements: (i)
that the mark is famous; (ii) that the defendant is making use of the mark in
commerce; (iii) that such use began after the mark became famous; and (iv) that
there is a likelihood of dilution as a result of the defendant’s use. Id.; Tiffany (NJ)
Inc., 600 F.3d at 111. The parties in the instant matter contest the extent to which
EA’s mark is famous and would be diluted as a result of Provide’s use.
i. The Fame of EA’s Mark
“[A] mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming
public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of
the mark’s owner.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). Courts may consider the following
factors: (i) the extent and geographic reach of the advertising and publicity of the
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mark, (ii) the volume and geographic extent of the sales of goods offered under
the mark, (iii) the extent of actual consumer recognition of the mark, and (iv)
whether the mark was registered on the principal register. Id. On summary
judgment, whether a mark has attained the requisite level of fame is a question of
fact that must be left to the trier of fact if the plaintiff shows “more than a mere
scintilla of evidence” of fame. See Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 450.
EA notes that it generated nearly a billion dollars in sales between 2001
and 2009. [Dkt. 136, Ex. C at 4]. In the years 2008 and 2009, EA spent $28 million
in advertising. [Id.]. EA’s mark is registered on the principal register. And, as
noted earlier, Provide’s own consumer survey found that EA had 77% brand
awareness among consumers nationally. [Dkt. 134, Ex. M. at PC 000967]. At this
stage, EA has pointed to sufficient evidence suggesting that its mark is famous
as to raise a material issue of fact. See, e.g., Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 450
(Plaintiff’s $20 million advertising spend, $675 million in revenues, and extensive
advertising in mainstream and industry media were “sufficient indicators of fame
to withstand a summary judgment challenge.”).
ii. Dilution by Blurring
Dilution by blurring is “association arising from the similarity between a
mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the
famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(2)(B). “Dilution by blurring refers . . . to ‘the
whittling away of [the] established trademark’s selling power and value through
its unauthorized use by others.’” Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 111. There are six
non-exhaustive factors which courts consider in determining whether there has
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been dilution by blurring, including: (i) the degree of similarity between the
marks, (ii) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark,
(iii) whether use of the famous mark is exclusive, (iv) the degree of recognition of
the famous mark, (v) whether the user of the mark intended to create an
association with the famous mark, and (vi) any actual association between the
mark and the famous mark. 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(2)(B)(-vi).
The first two factors – similarity and distinctiveness – overlap with the first
two Polaroid factors examined above, and, for the reasons stated above, the
court finds that these facts weigh in favor of EA at this stage. The fourth factor –
degree of recognition – also weighs in EA’s favor for the same reasons discussed
above in the Court’s determination that EA has pointed to sufficient evidence of
fame in the form of wide public recognition of EA’s mark. With regard to the fifth
factor, EA has also pointed to evidence that Provide intended to create an
association with EA’s mark by engaging in a deliberate marketing strategy to
misdirect consumers from EA’s website through the use of EA’s mark in
advertising, keyword bidding and typosquatting. EA has raised a material issue
of fact with regard to whether Provide’s conduct constituted dilution by blurring.

iii. Dilution by Tarnishment
Dilution by tarnishment is an “association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of
the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C). “A trademark may be tarnished
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when it is linked to products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an
unwholesome or unsavory context, with the result that the public will associate
the lack of quality or lack of prestige in the defendant’s goods with the plaintiff’s
unrelated goods.” Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994).
EA’s sole evidence in support of its dilution by tarnishment claim is the
fact that Provide coats its “dipped fruit” products in “imitation chocolate,”
instead of “real chocolate.” [Pl.’s Mem. at 32]. In this regard, EA has identified a
difference in quality between the two competing products. However, the statute
prohibits dilution resulting in “reputational harm” and “[t]he sina qua non of
tarnishment is a finding that plaintiff's mark will suffer negative associations
through defendant's use.” Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73
F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996). The critical missing link in EA’s dilution by
tarnishment claim is that the imitation chocolate used in Provide’s products will
taste, look or smell poorly to the consumer, resulting in a negative association
with EA’s mark. EA assumes this fact to be true, and its claim would require a
trier of fact to assume the truth that fact as well. At this stage, however, EA’s
“mere scintilla” of evidence of dilution by tarnishment is sufficient to create a
material issue of fact.

c. EA’s Claim for Cybersquatting
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) was passed in
part to prohibit “the bad-faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks as
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Internet domain names with the intent to profit from the goodwill associated with
such marks—a practice commonly referred to as ‘cybersquatting’.” Sporty's
Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 2000).
‘Typosquatting’ – in which the defendant registers intentional misspellings of a
distinctive marks – has been found to be an actionable form of cybersquatting.
See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 2001); Gioconda Law Grp.
PLLC v. Kenzie, 941 F. Supp. 2d 424, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“courts have expressly
held that the ACPA covers typosquatting”).
To prevail on its ACPA claim, EA must show that Provide: (1) had a bad
faith intent to profit; and (2) registers, traffics in or uses a domain name that is
identical or confusingly similar to EA’s famous and/or distinctive mark. See
Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 496-498; 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)(1)(A).
Provide argues that EA has failed to identify any evidence that it registered,
trafficked in or used the domain names at issue. EA admits that “the true
registrant of the Typosquatting Domains has not been conclusively determined,”
but nonetheless argues that Provide “and/or its agents trafficked in and/or used”
the domains to divert EA’s customers. [Pl.’s Mem. at 35]. In a prior ruling
denying Provide’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, this Court held that “if
through discovery it becomes apparent that the true owner of the typosquatting
domains registered the domain names on behalf of Provide Commerce, this
domain name registrant would be considered an agent” of the defendant and
would not have been a necessary party to the action in order to afford complete
relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Edible Arrangements, LLC v. Provide
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Commerce, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-00250 VLB, 2015 WL 1321441, at *4 (D. Conn. Mar.
24, 2015). Having conducted discovery into the matter, EA’s sole evidence in
support of its allegation that Provide’s agents trafficked and/or used the domains
at issue consists of the following facts:
1. Provide hired two digital marketing companies in late 2013 to increase
its web traffic – adMarketplace, Inc. and 7Search, Inc. [Dkt. 136, Ex.’s
DD, KK].
2. Shortly thereafter in January 2014, adMarketplace and 7Search records
show that redirects from the typosquatting domains to Provide’s
websites began and continued until June 2014. [Dkt. 136, Ex.’s EE, II,
NN].
3. Consumers attempting to reach ediblearrangements.com were
redirected to Provide’s competing website thousands of times. [Dkt.
136, Ex.’s EE, II, NN].
4. Provide admits that both adMarketplace and 7Search were somehow
involved in the redirects because both companies’ names appeared in
the URL reference code of the redirects. [Dkt. 136, Ex DD Twu Dep. at
207:4-14].
5. The redirects stopped after EA filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction and Provide sent a letter instructing adMarketplace to “[s]top
sending [Provide] traffic from these domains.” [Def.’s Mem. at 13].

It is clear from the facts above that Provide benefited from the
Typosquatting Domains in the form of additional web traffic and that Provide’s
web marketing agents played a role in redirecting web traffic from the
Typosquatting Domains to Provide’s own website. However, the precise role that
Provide’s marketing agents played in the process of registering the domains at
issue is still unclear. EA failed to offer evidence indicating that the redirection of
web traffic from theTtyposquatting Domains could not have occurred unless
adMarketplace and 7search were the “users” of those websites within the
meaning of the ACPA, through, for example, hosting or maintaining the
typosquatting domains or implementing the coding which resulted in the traffic
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redirection. EA had the opportunity to collect records from both adMarketplace
and 7search, to discover Provide’s contracts and communications with both
companies, to depose Provide’s web marketing team and the opportunity to
develop expert testimony on the issue to assist a trier of fact in drawing further
inferences from the evidence described above. EA failed to do so.
Moreover, even if there was clear evidence linking adMarketplace and
7search with the “use” of the domain names within the meaning of ACPA, the
statute makes clear that a defendant can only be liable for “use” of a
cybersquatting domain “if that person is the domain name registrant or that
registrant's authorized licensee.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(E). Thus, even if EA’s
evidence were sufficient to raise a material issue of fact with respect to whether
an agent of Provide “used” the Typosquatting Domains to redirect web traffic to
Provide, EA failed to offer evidencethat either Provide or its agent(s) are the
actual registrants of the domains or licensees of the actual registrants. Under the
plain language of the statute, EA has therefore raised insufficient evidence to
sustain an ACPA claim. Count VI of the Complaint is DISMISSED.

V.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment [Dkt. 116] is GRANTED IN PART with respect to EA’s ACPA claim
(Count VI) AND DENIED IN PART with respect to all other claims. Count VI is
DISMISSED. This case will proceed to trial with respect to all other claims.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

________/s/______________
Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: July 29, 2016
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